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COPYRIGHT LAW-A CHALLENGE TO
THE NINTH CIRCUIT's FIGHT
APPLYING LACHES IN
RAGING BULL SUIT
Jacqui Bogucki*THE old adage that "equity aids the vigilant" is often used as justifi-
cation for allowing the equitable defense of laches to apply in cop-
yright infringement cases where the copyright holder
unreasonably delays in filing suit and that delay causes prejudice to the
alleged infringers.' But should that protection exist, and if so, how far
should it go? A recent decision reinforces the Ninth Circuit's position
that the laches defense should be allowed in copyright actions to bar all
equitable and statutory relief-even if the action is still within the statute
of limitations.2 Although the circuits are split as to the exact extent laches
should be allowed in copyright infringement suits, 3 this Note argues that
the reinforcement of the Ninth Circuit's expansive view on the scope of
laches to bar copyright owners' relief in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. is unduly inequitable and hostile to innocent copyright
holders.
Following boxer Jake LaMotta's retirement, he and friend Frank Peter
Petrella ("F. Petrella") produced a screenplay in 1963, a book in 1970,
and another screenplay in 1973 about LaMotta's life, all of which would
become the basis for the 1980 movie Raging Bull.4 All three works were
registered with the United States Copyright Office in the year they were
produced, with F. Petrella listed as the sole claimant and author for both
the 1963 and 1973 screenplays; LaMotta listed as a coauthor for the 1963
screenplay; and LaMotta, Joseph Carter, and F. Petrella, under his pseu-
donym "Peter Savage," listed as coauthors of the 1970 book.5 On Novem-
ber 19, 1976, F. Petrella and LaMotta assigned their copyright rights in
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1. Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. Petrella v. Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 957, 959 (9th Cir. 2012); see
also Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954, 959-60.
3. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 958 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (noting the circuit split and the
Ninth Circuit's hostility toward copyright owners).




the two screenplays and the book, "exclusively and forever, including
all-periods of copyright and renewals and extensions thereof," 6 by writ-
ten agreement to Chartoff Winkler Productions,7 reserving for them-
selves "certain rights to the authors of the book."8 In September 1978,
Chartoff Winkler assigned the motion picture rights for Raging Bull to
United Artists Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer Studios ("MGM"), which subsequently registered a copy-
right in the film version of Raging Bull in September 1980.9
In 1981, F. Petrella died and his reserved renewal rights in the three
works passed on to his heir and daughter Paula Petrella ("Petrella").o
After learning about the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Stewart v.
Abend," which held that when an author dies before renewing his rights
in a work, his statutory successors are entitled to renew to those renewal
rights, even if the author had previously assigned those rights to a third
party,12 Petrella hired an attorney to assist her in renewing her rights in
the works in 1991.13 Petrella and her attorney first contacted the defend-
ants in 1998, "asserting that Petrella had obtained the rights to the 1963
screenplay and that the exploitation of any derivative work, including
Raging Bull, was an infringement of [those] exclusive rights."1 4 For the
next two years, Petrella and the defendants sent a series of letters back
and forth, with Petrella asserting that the defendants were infringing her
rights and threatening to take legal action, and the defendants countering
those assertions.' 5 Both during and after the exchange, the defendants
conducted transactions as though they were the rightful owners of Raging
Bull by, for example, licensing the film to various television networks
through 2015; spending $3 million in 2004 and 2005 to create, promote,
and distribute a special edition of the film; and spending more than
$100,000 to convert the film to Blu-Ray in 2008 and 2009.16
In 2009, Petrella brought suit against MGM and its subsidiaries, United
Artists, and 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment for copyright in-
fringement, unjust enrichment, and an accounting for violating her rights
in F. Petrella's three works that formed the basis for the Raging Bull
film.' 7 The defendants filed for summary judgment, which the federal dis-
trict court granted, finding that the equitable defense of laches barred
Petrella's claims against the defendants.' 8 Petrella appealed the decision
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 950.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
12. See id. at 219-20.
13. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 950.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 954.




to the Ninth Circuit.19
Relying heavily on its 2001 decision in Danjaq v. Sony Corp.,20 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, without
ever reaching the merits of Petrella's claims.21 Notwithstanding the fact
that copyright infringement actions have a three-year statute of limita-
tions that accrueS22 from the date of the last alleged infringement,23 the
Ninth Circuit held that laches barred Petrella's claims, finding that she
unreasonably delayed filing suit for eighteen years, causing the defend-
ants undue prejudice. 24 Thus, the court concluded that the defendants
were entitled to summary judgment because there was "no genuine issue
of material fact" that they had proved their laches defense.25 Having
found the equitable laches defense successful, the court further ruled that
Petrella's unjust enrichment and accounting claims were barred because
both were equitable remedies. 26
According to the majority, laches barred Petrella's claims because she
unreasonably delayed filing suit that resulted in prejudice to the defend-
ants, even though her 2009 action was within the three-year statute of
limitations for claims under the Copyright Act.2 7 In the Ninth Circuit, a
defendant who asserts a laches defense has the relatively easy burden of
showing that "(1) the plaintiff delayed in initiating the lawsuit; (2) the
delay was unreasonable; and (3) the delay resulted in prejudice" to the
defendant. 28 First, the court looked to see if Petrella delayed in filing suit
by looking at the time from which she knew or should have known about
the defendant's alleged copyright infringement to the date she filed the
lawsuit. 29 The majority found that since Petrella knew she had potential
infringement claims against the defendants as early as 1991, but did not
file suit until 2009, she had delayed in initiating the suit for a period of
eighteen years.30 Next, the court looked to the underlying cause of Pe-
trella's delay in filing suit to determine if her delay was reasonable or
unreasonable. 31 Petrella asserted that she delayed in filing suit against the
defendants for eighteen years because (1) "the film was deeply in debt
and . .. would probably never recoup"; (2) she "did not know there was a
time limit to making such claims"; and (3) family and financial issues side-
tracked her.3 2 The majority found that Petrella's delay was unreasonable
19. See id. at 951.
20. 263 F.3d 942 (2001).
21. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 956.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006).
23. See Urbant v. Sony Music Entm't, 863 F. Supp. 2d 279, 281, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(describing the "injury rule" for accrual).
24. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 955-56.
25. Id. at 952, 957.
26. Id. at 956.
27. See id. at 957.
28. Id. at 951-52.






because "its purpose [was] to capitalize on the value of the alleged in-
fringer's labor, by determining whether the infringing conduct [was] prof-
itable." 33 Lastly, the court found that Petrella's unreasonable delay
caused prejudice to the defendants because "during the delay, [the de-
fendants] invested money to expand [their] business [and] entered into
business transactions based on [their] presumed rights" 34 when they en-
tered into licensing agreements with television networks and spent mil-
lions creating, promoting, and distributing enhanced versions of the
Raging Bull film. 3 5 Finding the defendants' laches defense successful, the
court used it to bar the equitable relief sought by Petrella in her claims of
unjust enrichment and accounting. 36
In his concurring opinion, Judge Fletcher agreed that Petrella's claims
should be barred by laches "only because [the court is] compelled to fol-
low [its] opinion in Danjaq,"37 but expressed strong concerns over
whether the Ninth Circuit "provide[s] appropriate protection to innocent
copyright owners who have brought infringement suits within the statute
of limitations." 3 In particular, Fletcher noted that "[t]here is nothing in
the copyright statute or its history to indicate that laches is a proper de-
fense to a suit brought under the Act." 39 Specifically, he referred to the
fact that when Congress first amended the Copyright Act in 1957 to in-
clude a three-year statute of limitations, 40 the "accompanying Senate Re-
port noted that the adoption of a federal limitations period would
extinguish equitable defenses such as laches." 41 Thus, he concluded, using
the judicially created laches defense in infringement suits directly contra-
venes Congress's intent of not having equitable defenses apply in copy-
right cases.42
Fletcher also identified a "severe circuit split" on the use of laches in
copyright infringement cases, 4 3 and strongly admonished the Ninth Cir-
cuit for being "the most hostile to copyright owners of all the circuits." 44
Fletcher noted, for example, that the Fourth Circuit in Lyons Partnership
v. Morris Costumes disallowed laches in copyright actions if the action
was properly brought within the limitations period.45 Furthermore, he
noted that circuits allowing laches in copyright cases brought within the
statute of limitations limit it to cases with unusual circumstances and per-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 953.
35. See id. at 953-54.
36. Id. at 956.
37. Id. at 958 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 959.










mit limited kinds of relief. 4 6 For example, the Eleventh Circuit held that
laches may be allowed "[o]nly in the most extraordinary circum-
stances,"47 and even then only bars recovery for retrospective damages.48
In light of these circuit court positions, Fletcher averred that the Ninth
Circuit "[had] taken a wrong turn in its formulation and application of
laches in copyright cases." 49
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Petrella, affirming its broad application
of laches in copyright infringement actions, is another disappointing re-
sult stemming from its flawed precedent. Although the Ninth Circuit cor-
rectly applied the laches defense as laid out in Danjaq, it arrived at an
inequitable result. Even in 2009, the defendants conducted transactions
relating to the Raging Bull rights.50 Because a claim accrues from the
date of the infringement under the Copyright Act,5 ' when Petrella
brought her copyright infringement claims against defendants in 2009,
they were properly brought within the Act's three-year statute of limita-
tions.52 Thus, Petrella's claim should not have been barred by laches. In
the alternative, even if laches did apply, barring all forms of relief-statu-
tory and equitable, retrospective and prospective-was unjust. Why
should Petrella not be able to recover for the defendants' copyright in-
fringement when that infringement was occurring at the time she filed
suit? This also begs another question: Why is the Ninth Circuit so willing
to protect an infringer's rights by the relatively easy application of the
laches defense, but so reluctant to give copyright owners the protection
owed to them for taking the time to actually register their works? For
example, to successfully assert a laches defense in the Ninth Circuit, a
defendant does not even have to prove that the plaintiff had actual
knowledge of the defendant's infringement: the standard is simply
"should have known."53 Moreover, it is baffling that a court would im-
pose the judicially-created doctrine of laches to bar a plaintiff from as-
serting a meritorious copyright claim within the statute of limitations,
overriding Congress's express intent. The court must be wary of overstep-
ping its bounds and violating separation of powers principles when it im-
poses its thoughts on whether an action is equitable or not, thus
validating a laches defense, over the express will of Congress in creating a
specified statute of limitations period.
46. See id., see also Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007)
(holding that laches may be used in copyright infringement cases only in "the most compel-
ling of cases"); New Era Publ'g Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1989)
(allowing laches to bar injunctive relief, but not monetary damages).
47. Peter Letterese v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int'l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1320
(11th Cir. 2008).
48. Id. at 1321.
49. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 959.
50. See id. at 954.
51. See Urbant v. Sony Music Entm't, 863 F. Supp. 279, 281, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006).
53. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 959 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
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Further, and contrary to the position taken by the Ninth Circuit in Pe-
trella, most circuits severely limit the effect of laches in copyright infringe-
ment claims.54 For example, the Fourth Circuit in Lyons expressly
disallowed the use of laches in copyright cases.55 The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that using laches in copyright cases could not be allowed because
(1) laches only applies to actions at equity, not actions at law;5 6 (2) sepa-
ration of powers principles dictate that the judicially created doctrine of
laches cannot trump Congress's express will to allow a cause of action;57
and (3) the Supreme Court itself has recognized in several cases that
laches does not have a place in legal actions properly brought within a
statute of limitations.58 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit allows laches in
copyright actions "[o]nly in the most extraordinary circumstances." 5 9 Al-
though the Eleventh Circuit does not completely disallow laches in copy-
right actions,60 it still maintains "a strong presumption that a plaintiff's
suit is timely if it is filed before the statute of limitations has run," 61 and
even if laches is applied, its effect is limited as a "bar only to the recovery
of retrospective damages, not to prospective relief." 62
If Petrella had brought her copyright infringement claims against the
defendants in any other circuit but the Ninth, a very different and much
more equitable result would have occurred. In the Fourth Circuit, for ex-
ample, she would have had the opportunity to prove her claim because a
laches defense is not allowed for copyright claims brought within the stat-
ute of limitations.63 Further, in the Eleventh Circuit, there is a fair chance
that laches would not have applied, and even if it did, she would still have
been able to receive prospective relief from the defendants' infringement
of her rights in Raging Bull." Both of these results would be infinitely
fairer than the Ninth Circuit's complete bar to all relief, even though she
brought her copyright claims within the prescribed statute of limitations.
As the Ninth Circuit likely sees more copyright cases than any other
circuit, it must give serious consideration to the unjust effects that its ap-
plication of laches has in the copyright context. Perhaps Judge Fletcher's
admonition that the Ninth Circuit "has taken a wrong turn in its formula-
tion and application of laches in copyright cases" 65 will encourage the
court to revisit its prior decisions and reverse its current wayward direc-
tion. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit will revisit this very issue involving the
very same film again in the near future with LaMotta wanting to make a
54. See, e.g., Peter Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1321; Lyons, 243 F.3d at 797-98.
55. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 798.
56. Id. at 797.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 797-98.
59. Peter Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1320.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1320-21.
63. See Lyons, 243 F.3d at 798.
64. See Peter Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1321.




Raging Bull sequel, and MGM claiming that LaMotta does not have the
rights to make a movie based on his own life. 6 6 Or perhaps the Supreme
Court will step in to resolve this circuit split, and decide whether a judi-
cially-created notion like laches can overrule Congress's express intent
and bar a copyright infringement action brought within the specified stat-
ute of limitations.
Whatever future actions may be taken by the circuit courts of appeal
and the Supreme Court to resolve this split, litigants can be sure of one
thing in copyright actions filed in the Ninth Circuit: even a brief delay in
filing suit may result in a meritorious claim being barred by laches even if
filed within the Copyright Act's statutory allowance. The Ninth Circuit,
with its low standard for successfully asserting a laches defense, is too
willing to save copyright infringers from the mere hint of prejudice, while
ignoring the inequitable result to innocent copyright owners. Accord-
ingly, the Ninth Circuit needs to reevaluate its use of laches in copyright
actions and develop an application that is equitable to all parties, sup-
portive of Congress's express will, and in line with its sister circuits.
66. LaMotta's Got Punch, N.Y. POST (July 5, 2012,11:26 PM), http://www.nypost.com/
p/pagesix/lamotta got_puncho8Izs22oZyPZJO7mNqyJNN.
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